















The study of international institutions has mainly dealt with economic or social issues, and
the importance of international institutions in the realm of security issues has been largely
overlooked. However, recent academic efforts try to extend the domain of institutional the-
ory to security issues. This is the second of a two-part survey of security institutional studies,
with a focus on their implication on alliance studies. This part reviews the liberal institution-
alists'literature that looks into the choice of institutional design in the realm of security
cooperation, as well as the alternative institutional theories including realism, constructivism,
and rational choice theory.
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なアセット特定性) ③技術革新(輸送とコミュニケ-ション手段) ④ (宗教的、言語的、文
化的、政治的背景における)異種混交性の度合い8)、によって測られる。
3) Katja Weber, Hie和rchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice (Albany : State University
of New York Press, 2000).
4)例えばOliver Williamson, The EconomかInstitutions of Capitalism (New York, Free Press, 1985)
5) Weber, op. ciま, p. 6.
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Cen加ry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) ; David A. Lake, "Beyond Anarchy," International Seat-
nfy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 129-160.
10)位相は異なるが、従属論や覇権安定諭も国際政治における非対称的関係性を扱っている0
11) Lake, "Beyond-," p. 130.


























係的契約の理論(theory of relational contracting)」は、こうした既存理論の欠陥を乗り越
えようとする。
レイクは、安全保障関係の選択は、 ①結合生産の経済(joint production economies) ②機









































19) James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanation for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Summer,
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権国の存在が取引コストを低くするという議論だとしている　Robert 0.Keohane, "International Institutions:
Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32 (1988), p. 387.
27) Hasenclever et. al.. op. at, pp. 86-7
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葡「五enberry, "Getting Hegemony Right," pp. 20-22.
34) Ikenberry, After l仮tory, p. 64.
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